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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the impact of the Freedom of in formation Act (FOIA) enacted in 2011 on public 
procurement in Nigeria in  terms of accountability and participation. As such, it employs the principal-agent 
methodology and concludes that the agency problems inherent in public procurement and some of the attendant 
consequences such as government failures and market failures can be addressed with the enforcement of the 
FOIA 2011. These corrective measures include (but not limited to) providing access to informat ion, choice, fair 
market price, and the ability to enforce contracts; as well as electronic reporting, protection of whistle blowers, 
oversight functions, private public partnership, cit izens report card, and efficient participation of the media and 
civil society organizations. 
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1. Introduction and Rationale 
 
Nigeria has been bedeviled main ly by corruption and weak institutions that have failed to address the attendant 
negative externalit ies. The public procurement process is a typical example o f a process mired in an agency 
problem that has stifled economic growth and development. Specifically, the agency problem is a situation 
where an individual’s interest is in conflict with the society’s interest. As a result, the negative consequences 
(agency costs or negative externalities) extend to the society in general. In  response to this problem, the Nigerian  
authorities have embarked on good governance reforms such as the adoption of the Public Procurement Act 
(PPA) 2007 and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2011, respectively.  
 
Thus, the objective of this paper is to examine the FOIA 2011 and PPA 2007 with respect to enhancing 
accountability and public part icipation in government spending. Clearly, some of the fundamentals to attaining a 
viable economy include the need for accountability and participation in government spending. Hence, 
transparency – results from widely understood and clearly enforced rules coupled with transactions involving 
these rules should be clear and unambiguous (Prahalad 2006). The fundamental questions utilized herein are 
twofold: 1) What explains failure in  government spending; and 2) What might be needed for success? The paper 
further attempts to address these questions by utilizing the principal-agent methodology and recommends ways 
forward. The rest of the paper is as follows: section 2 captures overview of the FOIA 2011 and salient features of 
the PPA 2007, section 3 briefly narrates the related literature, section 4 presents the theoretical underpinnings 
and stylized facts, section 5 analyzes the FOIA and public p rocurement in the context of accountability and 




In accordance with the FOIA (2011) document, the FOIA Nigeria basically is designed: 
“To make public records and information more freely availab le, provide for public access to public records and 
informat ion, protect public records and informat ion to the extent consistent with the public interest and the 
protection of personal privacy, protect serving public officers from adverse consequences for disclosing certain 
kinds of official informat ion without authorizat ion and establish procedures for the achievement of those 
purposes and; for related matters.” 
 
The provisions contained in the FOIA 2011 are summarized below: 
 
 Right of access to records is a legal right of any citizen. 
 Information about public institutions comprising the three branches of government together with all 
corporations established by law and any organization that utilizes public funds has to be recorded and 
kept in a manner that facilitates public access to such information. 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.3, No.12, 2013 
 
141 
 Request or an application for access to records is in line with section 1 of the FOIA. Thus, any 
informat ion that is in  print  or otherwise used by the government or public institution shall be deemed a 
record under the control of government or public institution and shall be made availab le to any citizen  
upon request. However if access is wrongfully denied, the culprit is liable to a fine of five hundred 
thousand naira. 
 Fees are not to exceed standard charges for document duplication and transcription if necessary. 
 Destruction or falsificat ion of records is deemed a criminal offence punishable on conviction by a Court 
with a minimum of one year imprisonment.  
 Exemption of International Affairs and Defense in any matter that may be detrimental to the conduct of 
international affairs and defense of the nation. 
 Exemption of law enforcement and investigation in matters concerning law enforcement purposes or 
internal matters of a public institution to the extent that disclosure would  potentially jeopardize fairness 
and due process. 
 Training of officials on the right to information and on the effective implementation of this Act. 
 Exemption of personal information with respect to clients, patients, residents, students, or persons 
receiving services directly o r indirectly from public institutions. Conversely, disclosure is allowed g iven 
the consent of the individual concerned and where the information is availab le to the public as well as if 
the public interest in the disclosure significantly outweighs the protection of personal privacy. 
 Exemption of third party information in matters relating to trade secrets and commercial or financial 
informat ion obtained from a person or business where such information is proprietary, priv ileged or 
confidential or in jurious to the third party. Nonetheless, disclosure may be denied in cases involving 
environmental information that is in the public interest with respect to public health, safety, or 
protection of the environment. 
 Exemption of professional or other privileges conferred by law include: attorney-client, doctor-patient, 
journalis m confidentiality, and any course or research materials prepared by faculty as well as other 
professional privileges. 
 Exempted materials include: published material or material available for purchase by the public, library  
or museum material, or non-public section of the national archive on behalf of any person or 
organization other than the public sector. 
 Judicial rev iew for denial of access to information can be sought through a court review of the matter 
within 30 days after denial and said application shall be heard and determined summarily by the court. 
 Access to informat ion by the Court is granted for examination of info rmation under the control of a 
public institution to which this Act applies. However, the Court should avoid unnecessary or illegal 
disclosure. 
 Burden of proof in any p roceeding before the Court for denial of access rests with the public institution 
and the Court reserves the right to decide in favor or against. 
 Protection of public officers for the disclosure of information in good faith. 
 Documents under classification are not necessarily exempted from disclosure. 
 Submission of reports to the Attorney General (AG) is on or before February 1 of each year which  
covers the preceding fiscal year and shall include among other matters the number of denials and 
reasons, appeals by individuals, number pf pending applicat ions, the time period fo r processing 
applications, processing fees, and personnel involved. Furthermore, the AG would follow through with 
an annual report to the legislature on or before April 1 of each year. 
 Complimentary procedures imply that this Act complements all other existing procedures before it and 
not intended to limit their accessibility or availability. 
 Interpretations of terms within the provisions are as cited in the FOIA 2011. 
 
The PPA 2007 under Act No. 14 generally stated in the document (PPA, 2007): 
“An Act to establish the National Council on Pub lic Procurement and the Bureau of Public Procurement as the 
regulatory authorities responsible for the monitoring and oversight of public procurement, harmonizing the 
existing government policies and  
practices by regulating, setting standards and developing the legal framework and professional capacity for 
public procurement in Nigeria, and for related matters.”  
 
Some of the relevant features of the PPA 2007 within the context of the aforementioned topic include the scope 
of application, fundamental principles for procurement, organization of procurements, and procurement methods.  
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• First, the scope of the application stipulates that the provisions of Act No. 15 shall apply to all 
procurement of goods, works, and services carried out by the federal government and all procurement 
entities; all others that derive a minimum of 35% appropriat ion from the federation; and shall not apply 
to the procurement of special goods, works, and services involving national defense or security unless 
approved by the President. 
• Second, the fundamental principles include but not limited to the following: economy (utility 
maximization), efficiency (fu ll employment of resources and full production), equity (fairness or 
economic justice), t ransparency (clear ru les and regulations), accountability (probity), and ethics 
(standards of morality). 
• Third, organization of procurements consists of approving authority, planning, implementation, 
accounting officer, planning committee, tenders board, pre-qualification of bidders, and open 
competitive bidding. 
• Fourth, procurement methods encompass invitations to bid, bid security, submission of bids, reject ion 
of bids, validity periods of bids and modifications as well as withdrawal of tenders, bid opening, 
examination of bids, acceptance of bids, domestic preferences, mobilizat ion fees, contract performance 
guarantee, interest on delayed payments, and record of procurement proceedings. 
 
 Figure 1: Nigeria’s Fiscal Portfolio 
 
 Source:  Nigeria-Country Brief, World Bank – International Development Agency, 2010  
3. Related Literature 
 
In a related literature, Longren, Persson, and Weibull (2002) summarized the Nobel prize works of George 
Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz on asymmetric information and the functioning of markets, 
particularly contracts. For instance, Akerlof captured how informational asymmetries potentially lead to adverse 
selection in markets; Spence explained how informed economic agents in imperfect markets may utilize 
incentives to take observable and expensive actions to credib ly signal their private information  to uninformed  
agents, so as to improve their market outcomes; while St iglitz demonstrated how poorly informed agents can get 
informat ion from more informed  agents through screening process. In a comparat ive study, Kamil (2007) 
distinguished between the models of symmetric and asymmetric informat ion and found that the optimal contract 
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is the result of a tradeoff between optimal risk allocation and optimal incentive mechanisms. Thus, the effort will 
be less for asymmetric information relative to symmetric information. 
 
4. Theoretical Underpinnings and Stylized Facts  
 
The theoretical underpinnings of public procurements and freedom of in formation could be stylized from the 
theory of the Principal-Agent problem. There are two basic examples of this relationship which is constrained by 
asymmetric in formation. First is hidden informat ion or adverse selection and second is hidden action or moral 
hazard. Examples of adverse selection include where an employee typically knows more about his or her ability 
than the employer and the buyer of an  insurance policy  knows more about his or her own risk relative to the 
insurance agency. However, in the case of moral hazard, a classic example is the case of a driver of a car that is 
insured and does drive recklessly because the car is covered by the insurance company. 
 
Following Ray (1998), an economical powerful entity, namely, the principal that controls scarce resources that 
give it monopoly or quasi-monopoly power to dictate the terms of the contract or make take-it-o r-leave-it offers 
to one or more individuals called agents. Examples are a government seeking a supplier to provide some public 
goods like   highways, the regulation of public utilities, or a  landlord-tenant relat ionship. Assume the Federal 
Government of Nigeria (FGN) is the principal and the individual contractor or firm is the agent. The contractor, 
say firm Z has a reservation utility  Ủ–  the utility he will obtain  by making  the best use of its time and resources 
elsewhere. The contract that FGN (the principal) offers should be such that the utility that firm Z (the agent) gets 
from this contract job must be at least equal to the utility it  could receive from an alternative. This y ields the 
participation constraint.  
 
Assume Q is the output obtained after work, where Q denotes two values H for h igh and L fo r low and depends 
on effort input e. A ll things considered, if there are two  levels of effort  choices: e = 0 or e = 1. Thus, when there 
is no effort  or zero  effo rt, chance of h igh output is q. Nevertheless, when the higher level of effort is given, there 
is a greater chance of a high output p. The h igher level of effort  involves a cost E for firm Z. A lso, it  is assumed 
that the agent (firm Z) is risk averse and thus U = U(w) where U is utility,  w is the money income, and U(•) is a  
strictly increasing and concave function implying that 
 
(1)  ΩU(w1) + (1-Ω)U(w2)  <  U (Ωw1 + (1- Ω) w2) 
 
Where Ω is any proper fraction and w1 and w2 are two respective values of firm Z’s monetary income. Equation 
(1) implies that whenever firm Z encounters risk, its expected utility is lower under asymmetric information than 
symmetric information. The principal (FGN) is risk neutral. Furthermore, suppose that input of high effort 
maximizes expected net surplus in line with Pareto efficiency that can be expressed algebraically as: 
 
(2)  pH + (1 - p)L – E > qH + (1 – q) L. 
 
Hence, can be re-written as the condition below:  
 
(3)  (p – q) (H – L) > E. 
 
Presumably, an efficient allocation of resources; where no one can be made better o ff without making anyone 
else worse off. Moreover, if given the choice of effort, the expected net output produced is a sufficient condition 
to satisfy at least the agent’s (firm Z’s) reservation utility such that: 
 
(4)  qH + (1 – q)L ≥ ẃ, 
 
Where ẃ is the payment that is at least equal to the reservation utility, expressed as  
 
(5)  U(ẃ) = Ủ. 
 
Equation (5) implies that the marginal cost is equivalent to the marg inal benefit –  an optimal allocation of 
resources for both the principal and the agent. 
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5. The FOIA and Public Procurement in Nigeria 
 
In line with the Federal Republic of Nigeria public procurement procedure manual,   published by the Bureau of 
Public Procurement, the main tenets of proficient public procurement are: economy, efficiency, fairness, 
reliability, transparency, accountability, and ethical standards. Therefore, lack of accountability or probity  can 
lead to inefficient production of goods and services as evidenced in the poor quality of public works, 
(infrastructure), maintenance, and delivery  of services. Essentially, the accountability of procurement officials is 
critical to the success or failure of a pro ject and by extension the development of the country. One way to verify  
this issue is to analyze the freedom of info rmation and procurement process in Nigeria in the context of 
accountability and participation in  government spending in light of the deteriorating fiscal portfolio of Nigeria as 
depicted above in figure 1 – showing that social welfare (protection) allocation by the government  is inadequate 
given a population of about 150 million people where more than thirty-three percent is below the poverty level 
(Nwafor 2010).  
 
An application of the principal-agent methodology or framework can shed some light into the accountability of 
procurement officials with respect to government spending. First, lack of accountability by procurement officials 
may lead to social costs in the forms of corruption, favorit ism or nepotism. Oversight functions by the legislature 
are not likely to be effective since procurement officials have better informat ion about procurement costs than 
the legislature – a government failure occurs because of asymmetries of access to information, choice, fair 
market price, and the ability to enforce contracts. From a private sector perspective, lack of accountability may  
lead to contractors providing sub-standard goods and services while utilizing government funds. Consequently, 
distortions due to maladministration and corruption prosper in association with deadweight loss – net loss of 
both consumer and producer surpluses. This is akin  to the moral hazard problem, where agents will change their 
behavior as a result of a contract. For example, g iven lack of or inadequate accountability and supervision, 
suppliers (contractors) will engage in less efficient production of goods or delivery of services. Second, another 
view of the principal-agent problem in the procurement process is the absence of incentives to internalize costs 
associated with eliminating corrupt practices since these costs can be externalized to the society. This is similar 
to the fallacy of composition in that each agent assumes that his/her action is so negligible to be significant to the 
greater good or service of the entire society. However, the collective actions of these agents over-allocate 
resources and thus overwhelm the absorptive capacity of the system to maximize the welfare of its citizens. 
Third, weak institutional arrangements exacerbate the principal-agent problem since bad behavior is likely to  go 
unpunished as exemplified in  various scandals such as oil subsidy, pension, capital market, to mention a few. All 
these inefficiencies culminate in negative externalit ies (agency costs) to the society and hamper social and 
economic development. 
 
To address the foregoing government failures in the procurement process emanating from the principal-agent 
problem, accountability and greater part icipation in government spending are necessary control measures for 
effective and efficient production and delivery of goods and services as well as stimulating growth and 
development. One, the adoption of the FOIA is a step in the right direct ion to ensuring that accountability and 
participation in government spending are enhanced. The FOIA provides opportunities for greater accountability, 
transparency, and efficiency in the procurement process by reducing asymmetric informat ion in access to 
informat ion, choice, fair market price, and the ability  to enforce contracts. Two, contrary to the p rivate sector 
where procurement agents can be threatened with dis missal, the public procurement officials can somet imes 
collude with the oversight and monitoring authorities to avoid sanctions or punishments – a case of quid pro quo. 
In this case, the FOIA can assist in protecting whistle blowers in  government whose activities reduce wasteful 
spending such as the agency problem in the procurement process. Three, government agencies can be effectively  
monitored  by enhancing capacity building in  oversight functions of agencies like the Government Accounting 
Office and the Office of Management and Budget.  
 
Other corrective measures in government spending stem from enhancing participation by the society (people) 
through electronic government reporting, citizens report card, and public-private partnership in addit ion to the 
media and civil society organizations. Electronic government reporting not only provides access to information, 
it also enhances awareness of government planning, implementation, and control mechanisms and thus improve 
procurement management. Moreover, greater part icipation in government spending can be generated via citizens 
report card – a system devised to hold government accountable by highlighting the poor quality of public service 
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provision and demand change based on the feedback from users of the services plus grades received by each 
agency on the quality of services provided (Narayan and Glinkaya 2007). Furthermore, greater participation 
through collaboration  between the public and the private sector in fo rm of public-p rivate partnership (PPP) is 
helpful in monitoring and evaluating procurement process and government spending. Finally, the role of the 
media as a watchdog and the pressure exerted from civil society organizations sensitize the public and enhance 
their participation in government spending not only in public procurement but other fiscal policy matters. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The findings from an  analysis of the FOIA and public procurement via accountability and public participation in  
government spending utilizing the principal-agent problem framework are quite informative. Firstly, the 
principal-agent problem lead to government failures and sometimes market failures since agents are likely to 
subvert their principals’ objectives in place of theirs. The results are government failures and some of the 
negative effects might cause market failures. Secondly, corrective measures include reducing asymmetrical 
informat ion by providing access to informat ion, choice, fair market price, and the ability to enforce contracts. 
These could be achieved with the effective ut ilization of the FOIA 2011. Additional correct ions for agency costs 
spilling out of the principal-agent problem inherent in the procurement process include: oversight functions by 
the responsible government agencies and protection of whistle b lowers through the FOIA; electronic reporting to 
increase accountability, t ransparency, and efficiency; encouraging collaboration and participation through PPP;  
citizens report card for g reater participation and accountability; and effect ive participation of the media (press) as 
well as civil society organizations in order to enhance public awareness, accountability, and participation in  
government spending and other public policy matters.  
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